NISG 2026: What Austrian Companies Must Actually Do From 1 October 2026

Why a German NIS2 Checklist Does Not Carry Over to Austria

The Netz- und Informationssystemsicherheitsgesetz 2026 (NISG 2026) was promulgated as Article 1 of Federal Law Gazette BGBl. I No. 94/2025 on 23 December 2025. Under § 51(1) and (2) NISG 2026 its provisions enter into force nine months after promulgation, on the first day of the following month — that is 1 October 2026 (see https://ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2025_I_94/BGBLA_2025_I_94.pdf). At the same moment the old NISG 2018, the Netz- und Informationssystemsicherheitsverordnung and the Verordnung über qualifizierte Stellen cease to apply. The competent authority under § 3a(1) is the Federal Office for Cybersecurity (Bundesamt für Cybersicherheit), called the “Cybersicherheitsbehörde” in the statute; Markus Kasinger was appointed its director with effect from 1 October 2026 (see https://www.bundesamt-cybersicherheit.gv.at/102/start.html). The accompanying NISV 2026 ordinance (BGBl. II No. 290/2026) was promulgated on 1 October 2026 (see https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/II/2026/290).

Both statutes — Austria’s NISG 2026 and Germany’s NIS2 implementation act — transpose the same Directive (EU) 2022/2555, which Member States had to adopt by 17 October 2024 and apply from 18 October 2024 (Article 41 of the directive, see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj). Both countries were substantially late. The substance — risk management, supply chain security, tiered reporting deadlines — is accordingly similar. What differs is everything that actually steers an implementation project: which authority you register with, through which channel, by when, who audits, who fines, and what the evidence looks like.

That is precisely why a NIS2 checklist imported from Germany saves no time in Austria; it introduces errors. It names the BSI as the counterparty, carries an expired registration deadline, uses the category "besonders wichtige Einrichtung" instead of "wesentliche Einrichtung", and omits the central Austrian mechanism — the self-declaration under § 33 NISG 2026 — altogether. The comparison below sets out the differences exactly where they hurt in a project plan. For the German obligations in depth — ten risk-management areas, the reporting cascade and management liability — see our article on the NIS2 Implementation Act.

Scope: 18 Sectors and Two Size Thresholds

§ 2 NISG 2026 lists 18 sectors: energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructures, health, drinking water, waste water, digital infrastructure, ICT service management (business-to-business), public administration, space, postal and courier services, waste management, manufacture and trade in chemicals, food, manufacturing and production of goods, digital service providers, and research. The sub-sectors are set out in Annexes 1 and 2 of the act.

Size classification follows § 25 NISG 2026 via the EU SME Recommendation 2003/361/EC. An entity counts as a large enterprise if it employs at least 250 people, or if it has annual turnover above EUR 50 million and a balance sheet total above EUR 43 million. It counts as a medium-sized enterprise if it employs at least 50 people, or has annual turnover above EUR 10 million together with a balance sheet total above EUR 10 million. Notable for group structures: under § 25(4) the figures of partner or linked enterprises are not aggregated where the entity is organisationally, technically and operationally independent in respect of the network and information systems it uses. That independence is a question of fact you must be able to evidence — shared Active Directory domains or a group SOC argue against it.

In addition, under § 26 NISG 2026 the Cybersicherheitsbehörde may classify an entity that does not meet the size threshold as an essential or important entity by formal decision — and may upgrade an important entity to an essential one. The size threshold is therefore a rebuttable rule, not a ceiling.

On the number of affected companies, candour is called for. The Austrian Federal Economic Chamber states around 4,000 companies and institutions of medium size and above across 18 sectors (see https://www.wko.at/it-sicherheit/nis2-uebersicht). That figure does not appear in the legislative materials: the regulatory impact assessment for government bill 308 der Beilagen XXVIII. GP expressly states that the actual number of affected entities will only become visible in the authority’s register (see https://www.parlament.gv.at/gegenstand/XXVIII/I/308). The 4,000 is therefore a chamber estimate, not a legislative determination. For comparison, the BSI puts Germany at around 29,500 covered entities (see https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Regulierte-Wirtschaft/NIS-2-regulierte-Unternehmen/nis-2-regulierte-unternehmen_node.html).

The Deadline Chain From 1 October 2026

Unlike Germany, where obligations went live immediately on entry into force and the registration deadline has already passed, Austria provides a staggered run-up. That staggering is not a reprieve; it is a schedule with four hard points.

1. 11 October 2026 — entry into force (done): §§ 2 to 45 NISG 2026 and the annexes have entered into force (§ 51(2)). Since that day the risk management duties of § 32 and the reporting duties of § 34 apply directly. There is no grace period: incidents from entry into force onwards are reportable under § 34.
2. 21 January 2027, 4 January 2027 at the latest — registration: registration under § 29(2) must occur within three months of entry into force (§ 29(3)). The Federal Office for Cybersecurity states “basically by 1 January 2027, owing to § 33(2) AVG by 4 January 2027 at the latest” (as of 2 October 2026, see https://www.bundesamt-cybersicherheit.gv.at/303/registrierung.html). Registration runs through the “NIS2-Services” application in the Unternehmensserviceportal (USP). Required details include name, address and contact data, sector and sub-sector, the EU Member States in which services are provided, IP address ranges, the address of the main establishment, and the data on thresholds and classification as an essential or important entity.
3. 330 September 2027 — self-declaration: under § 33(1), within twelve months of the registration duty arising, information on the risk management measures implemented must be submitted to the Cybersicherheitsbehörde, in particular on the network and information systems used, on supply chain security, and on the results of the risk analysis.
4. 4From 1 October 2028 — audits by independent bodies: the first request for proof under § 33(2) may be issued at the earliest two years after entry into force. Thereafter the rule is two years from the request — but only two months for essential entities as regards operational and organisational implementation.
5. 5Ongoing — change notifications: changes to name, address, contact data, sector or IP ranges must be notified within two weeks; changes to establishment and threshold classification within three months (§ 29(4)). That two-week deadline is the one most often missed in practice, because it attaches to entirely ordinary business events.

New at Launch: The NISV 2026 Ordinance Specifies Risk Management and Reporting Thresholds

On the day of entry into force the ordinance of the Cybersicherheitsbehörde on network and information system security (NISV 2026, BGBl. II No. 290/2026, issued on 1 October 2026) was promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette. It rests on § 32(5) and § 35(3) NISG 2026 and, under its § 9, enters into force at the end of the day of promulgation (see https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/II/2026/290). It adds two specifications to the statute that bear directly on an implementation project: the requirements for risk management and the criteria for significant incidents.

On risk management, § 2 NISV 2026 sets a course: the requirements of Article 2 and the Annex of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 also apply to the entity types in Annexes 1 and 2 NISG 2026 that this implementing regulation does not cover. In EU law it addresses DNS service providers, TLD name registries, cloud computing, data centre and managed service providers and other digital services (see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202402690). In Austria the technical requirements catalogue therefore applies to all essential and important entities. Added to this are the risk categories of § 3 — technological, human, ICT supply chain and site-related risks — and the rule of § 4: an entity that temporarily or because of its size cannot meet individual requirements implements compensating measures, documents them in a traceable and reasoned way and reviews their effectiveness at least annually.

For the reporting chain § 5(1) is the more important part. Under it a cybersecurity incident is in any case significant within the meaning of § 35(1) NISG 2026 where one of nine criteria is met; for six of them it suffices that the consequence may occur. The thresholds are concrete: a direct financial loss of more than EUR 500,000 or 5 percent of annual total turnover of the preceding financial year (the lower value counts, § 5(1) no. 1 NISV 2026) and an outage or restricted availability for more than 100,000 users or 10 percent of users for more than 24 hours (no. 7). Item 9 is particularly relevant in practice: an entity that activates crisis management or disaster recovery has in any case a significant incident — the escalation level in the incident runbook should therefore be tied to the reporting decision. Planned service interruptions and the planned consequences of scheduled maintenance are excluded under § 6, and repeated individual incidents are aggregated under § 7. The nine criteria at a glance:

The Self-Declaration: Austria’s Distinct Route

The largest structural difference from German law is § 33 NISG 2026. In Germany a recurring duty to prove implementation through audits, inspections or certifications every three years applies only to operators of critical installations (§ 39 BSIG 2025, see https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bsig_2025/BJNR12D0B0025.html). The bulk of German essential and important entities initially submits nothing proactively — it must be able to deliver when the BSI asks.

Austria inverts that. Every essential and every important entity must set out, on its own initiative and without being asked, in structured form and within twelve months, which risk management measures it has implemented. The format is prescribed by the Cybersicherheitsbehörde. That creates an obligation to deliver which Germany does not impose at this breadth — and a document the authority can later hold against the actual state of affairs.

The second stage is the audit by an independent body under § 33(2). It follows a request, builds on the entity’s own risk analysis, and proof of operational and organisational implementation may also be provided through relevant valid certificates — a practically important opening for organisations holding ISO/IEC 27001. Under § 33(3) an audit report must be submitted to the Cybersicherheitsbehörde, signed by the management bodies and by the independent auditors engaged, listing the deficiencies identified together with a remediation plan. Under § 33(4) the cost of these audits is generally borne by the audited entity. Planned audits must be notified to the authority at least one month in advance with an audit plan (§ 33(5)).

Two consequences follow immediately. First, a signature by the management bodies on a report that names their own deficiencies is a governance act, not an IT act — it belongs on the management meeting agenda in good time, not in the last week before the deadline. Second, anyone presenting themselves in the self-declaration as better than they are risks separate liability under § 45(4) no. 8 for knowingly false statements about the implementation of risk management measures. The converse is striking: under § 45(1) no. 3 the failure to implement risk management measures is punishable only where the authority learned of it other than solely through the self-declaration. The act privileges honest self-reporting and penalises the embellished version.

For substantive preparation, a structured maturity picture is the most effective lever. Our Cybersecurity Assessment maps the measure areas required by § 32 NISG 2026 and delivers exactly the structure in which the self-declaration must be argued. A first, non-binding position fix comes from our free NIS2 readiness check — with one honest caveat: this quick check assesses structural maturity along the NIS2 measure logic, but its legal references are aligned to German law. For the Austrian legal position it does not replace an assessment against the NISG 2026; it prioritises one.

Reporting Duties: Same Clock, Different Address

The reporting deadlines in § 34(2) NISG 2026 follow the directive and are therefore identical to the German ones: an early warning without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours of becoming aware of the significant incident, an incident notification with a first assessment of severity, impact and indicators of compromise within 72 hours, an interim report on request, and a final report no later than one month after the 72-hour notification. Where incident handling is still ongoing, a progress report takes the place of the final report, which then follows within one month of the handling being concluded.

The difference lies in the addressee. In Germany you report to the BSI. In Austria, under § 34(1), you report to the sector-specific CSIRT competent for your entity, or, where none exists, to the national CSIRT, which forwards the report to the Cybersicherheitsbehörde without delay. Since 1 October 2026 the computer emergency response teams are GovCERT for public administration, HealthCERT for the health sector and the national CSIRT with general competence (see https://www.bundesamt-cybersicherheit.gv.at/204/start.html); as long as no sector-specific CSIRT is authorised for a sector, CERT.at performs its tasks on an interim basis as the national CSIRT. Entities active in several sectors also report to each competent CSIRT. Reports go through the reporting platform in the Unternehmensserviceportal (USP), which has been in operation since 1 October 2026 and requires a USP account; if the portal is unavailable, PDF forms sent to reports@cert.at apply (see https://www.cert.at/de/nis2/ and https://www.bundesamt-cybersicherheit.gv.at/303/meldepflicht-und-fristen.html). For a company established in both countries this means two separate reporting channels, two access procedures and two contact lists — against an identical clock.

The quid pro quo is more generous than in Germany. Under § 34(4) the CSIRT must respond to the reporting entity no later than 24 hours after receipt of the early warning, including an initial assessment of the incident and, on request, operational advice on possible remediation. Where a criminal background is suspected, the CSIRT additionally provides guidance on reporting to law enforcement. This obligatory feedback channel makes the first report operationally valuable rather than a mere formality.

§ 34(3) adds a duty regularly absent from crisis exercises: where the incident impairs service delivery, the recipients of those services must be informed without delay, together with any countermeasures available to them. That is customer communication under time pressure — it needs prepared text modules and a settled approval chain, or it collides with the live incident response. How to embed such a reporting chain in a team is covered in our article on NIS2 compliance for IT teams.

Management Bodies, Fine Ceilings and the Route Into the Commercial Register

§ 31(1) NISG 2026 obliges the management bodies of essential and important entities to ensure and supervise compliance with the risk management measures. § 31(2) requires management bodies to attend cybersecurity training designed specifically for them; employees must be offered corresponding training on a regular basis. Both are separately punishable: § 45(1) nos. 1 and 2 expressly penalise failing to provide the training for management bodies and for employees.

The German counterpart is constructed differently. § 38 BSIG 2025 likewise obliges management to implement and supervise the measures and mandates regular training — but liability in subsection 2 leads into company law: management bodies are liable to their own entity for culpably caused damage under the rules applicable to its legal form, and under the BSIG itself only where company law contains no liability rule. The NISG 2026 contains no such internal liability provision, but it carries a sharper supervisory instrument.

Under § 39(4) no. 2 NISG 2026 the management bodies of an essential entity, including its legal representatives, may be temporarily prohibited by formal decision from performing management duties in that entity — and the Cybersicherheitsbehörde must transmit that decision to the commercial register court for entry in the Firmenbuch. The prohibition must be lifted without delay once the ordered measures have demonstrably been taken, and under § 39(6) it does not apply to public administration bodies. The reputational difference from the German regime remains considerable: an entry in the Firmenbuch is publicly searchable.

On monetary penalties the ceilings are near identical. § 45(2) NISG 2026 provides for up to EUR 10,000,000 or up to 2 percent of total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year for essential entities, whichever is higher; § 45(3) provides up to EUR 7,000,000 or 1.4 percent for important entities. The BSIG 2025 likewise provides up to ten million euros or 2 percent of total turnover for besonders wichtige Einrichtungen and up to seven million euros or 1.4 percent for wichtige Einrichtungen.

What is specific to Austria is the second fine tier. § 45(4) NISG 2026 attaches a long list of formal breaches — late or false registration, missed change notification, omitted or untrue self-declaration, audit report not submitted in time, obstruction of inspections and security scans — to a fine of up to EUR 50,000 and, on repetition, up to EUR 100,000. Those amounts are low enough to be underestimated, and the triggering conduct is purely administrative. They will hit precisely those organisations that are technically sound but administratively careless.

Procedurally the competences are cleanly separated. Under § 44(1) the imposition of administrative penalties rests with the Bezirksverwaltungsbehörden; the Cybersicherheitsbehörde merely refers the suspicion. Under § 44(3) and (4) fines may also be imposed on the legal person, among other cases where a lack of supervision or control by a person in a leading position made the breach possible. § 44(7) contains a practically important double jeopardy bar: where the data protection authority has already imposed a fine under Article 58(2)(i) GDPR for the same conduct, the Bezirksverwaltungsbehörde may not impose a penalty under the NISG 2026.

The documentary side of these duties — dated approval, traceable oversight, evidenced training attendance — can be produced systematically with our Governance Doc Generator. Which service tier you need for that is set out in our pricing overview.

Groups Operating in Both Countries: What Runs Twice, What Runs Once

For groups with companies in Germany and Austria the decisive question is not whether you must be compliant twice — you must, because both statutes attach to the individual entity and not to the group. The question is which artefacts you build once and merely file differently.

Everything substantive can be built once: the risk analysis, the security concept, the incident response plan, the supplier register with risk classes, backup and restore evidence, cryptography and access control concepts, training content. Both statutes transpose the same catalogue of measures from the directive; the substance overlaps enough to carry a single shared control set.

What must run twice is everything formal and authority-facing. That means two registrations with different access routes, two reporting chains with different recipients and credentials, deadline calendars with different key dates, evidence formats — Germany’s proof duty for critical installations versus Austria’s self-declaration for all entities — and the respective training records per management body and per company.

One special case deserves attention: classification under § 25(4) NISG 2026. Where an Austrian subsidiary is organisationally, technically and operationally independent of the group, group figures are not aggregated for the size threshold. Centralised IT effectively removes that independence and may therefore be what brings the entity into scope in the first place. Anyone who does not decide this question in documented form still decides it — just unconsciously.

How to overlay several regulatory regimes without duplicating work is covered in depth in The 2026 regulatory collision. The underlying logic applies here one to one: build controls once, vary the evidence format per regime and per jurisdiction. An overview of the instruments for that is in our template library.

Roadmap After the 1 October 2026 Start

The statute has applied since 1 October 2026 and the registration deadline is running. The roadmap below prioritises by liability exposure and deadline risk rather than technical elegance: what protects the management bodies in proceedings comes first.

1. 1Immediately — decide scope in documented form: check sector membership under § 2 and Annexes 1 and 2, calculate the size classification under § 25, and, where the entity belongs to a group, reason through the independence question under § 25(4). Record the result as a dated resolution of the management bodies — including, and especially, a negative one.
2. 2By mid-October 2026 — prepare access and registration data: secure USP access, equip the designated users with an ID Austria, and assign the roles “NIS Registrierung” and “NIS Meldung”. Assemble all details required by § 29(2), in particular the IP address ranges and the list of EU Member States in which services are provided. In our experience those two items take longest, because they cut across network operations and sales at the same time.
3. 3By end of October 2026 — arm the reporting chain: identify the competent CSIRT (GovCERT, HealthCERT or the national CSIRT CERT.at), set up access to the reporting platform in the USP, assess significance against the nine criteria of § 5 NISV 2026 in documented form, name roles with deputies, prepare text templates for the early warning, the 72-hour notification and the customer information required by § 34(3), and test them in a tabletop exercise. The reporting duty has applied since 1 October 2026, not from registration onwards.
4. 4By November 2026 — file the registration: do not wait until year-end. A six-week buffer absorbs authority queries and access problems without putting the deadline at risk.
5. 5Q1 to Q3 2027 — build the substance behind the self-declaration: update the risk analysis, set up the supplier register with risk classes, record restore tests with date and result, complete management body training and evidence attendance. The self-declaration is not a writing project; it is the summary of what was actually done beforehand.
6. 6By September 2027 — file the self-declaration and become audit-ready: submit the declaration in the format prescribed by the authority and, in parallel, check whether existing certificates support the proof required under § 33(2). Anyone who must expect a request from October 2028 onwards should already know the audit path by then.